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AbstrACt
Objectives To understand approaches to priority setting 
for healthcare service resource allocation at an operational 
level in a nationally commissioned but regionally delivered 
service.
Design Qualitative study using semistructured interviews 
and a Framework analysis.
setting National Health Service dentistry commissioning 
teams within subregional offices in England.
Participants All 31 individuals holding the relevant role 
(dental lead commissioner in subregional offices) were 
approached directly and from this 14 participants were 
recruited, with 12 interviews completed. Both male and 
female genders and all regions were represented in the 
final sample.
results Three major themes arose. First, ‘Methods 
of priority setting and barriers to explicit approaches’ 
was a common theme, specifically identifying the 
main methods as: perpetuating historical allocations, 
pressure from politicians and clinicians and use of needs 
assessments while barriers were time and skill deficits, 
a lack of national guidance and an inflexible contracting 
arrangements stopping resource allocation. Second, 
‘Relationships with key stakeholders and advisors’ were 
discussed, showing the important nature of relationships 
with clinical advisors but variation in the quality of these 
relationships was noted. Finally, ‘Tensions between 
national and local responsibilities’ were illustrated, where 
there was confusion about where power and autonomy 
lay.
Conclusions Commissioners recognised a need for 
resource allocation but relied on clinical advice and needs 
assessment in order to set priorities. More explicit priority 
setting was prevented by structure of the commissioning 
system and standard national contracts with providers. 
Further research is required to embed and simplify 
adoption of tools to aid priority setting.
IntrODuCtIOn 
In any healthcare system, those responsible 
for organising the provision of services (in 
England, commissioners) have difficult 
choices to make in that there are insufficient 
resources to provide all possible services.1 
Prioritisation for resource allocation must, 
therefore, be undertaken and this is often 
a complex task as healthcare systems have 
multiple competing objectives.2 Although 
historically, taking England prior to 2012 
as an example, prioritisation was under-
taken implicitly using inefficient methods 
(such as perpetuating historical resource 
allocations or allocating resources based 
on pressure from clinicians, the public or 
policy-makers and politicians), there is an 
increasing recognition that more explicit, 
formalised approaches to priority setting 
would be useful.3 These explicit approaches 
involve making decisions whereby options 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The qualitative nature of this study allows a complex 
area to be explored in depth.
 ► The national sample adds value beyond the case 
studies, which predominate in this area.
 ► The operational rather than strategic level of those 
recruited offers an unusual insight into priority set-
ting practice at this level.
 ► The specific area studied (dentistry) may be unusu-
al and the variation in health systems globally may 
mean the insights offered are very specific.
 ► The sample size was limited, however, data satura-
tion was reached.
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for change (both investments and disinvestments) 
are assessed against each other on the basis of defined 
criteria, weighted for relative importance and considered 
also against the cost of each such option.
Many frameworks, methods and tools have been 
described for disinvestment (one aspect of resource 
allocation)4 and several of the described frameworks 
actually deal with the wider task of priority setting for 
resource allocation, for example, multicriteria deci-
sion analysis (MCDA),5 accountability for reasonable-
ness (A4R),6 Programme Budgeting Marginal Analysis 
(PBMA)7 or socio-technical allocation of resources 
(STAR).8 Tools have also been developed to operation-
alise these priority setting frameworks, for example, 
Public Health England’s Prioritisation Framework 
(although this is specific to commissioning of public 
health interventions).9
Despite the recognised need for explicit priority setting 
and the development of tools, the extent of actual use 
of explicit mechanisms remains underwhelming. The 
majority of research into use of such mechanisms often 
describes academically led case studies, undertaken as 
part of research studies and offers very little evidence 
of ongoing use and adoption beyond the academic case 
study.10 This case study-based approach also does not illu-
minate what those charged with resource allocation are 
actually doing in terms of priority setting in the absence 
of academic input. Four studies which looked at what was 
happening without or before academic involvement are 
relevant however and are described here. The first was a 
study looking at disinvestment decisions at regional level 
in Wales with senior managers.11 This study found that 
although all of the regions planned to undertake explicit 
prioritisation exercises, none had actually done this yet 
and that it was difficult to identify disinvestments required 
to free up resources to allow nationally mandated invest-
ments to occur. The second study in England reported 
on the forms of priority setting undertaken at local level, 
finding that there was a large variation in practice and 
that epidemiological needs data were used by nearly all 
respondents compared with less than one-quarter using 
decision support tools.3 The third example involved inter-
views with directors of finance in Scottish health boards, 
showing that none used explicit frameworks but that some 
had developed their own sets of criteria to judge decisions 
against.12 All three of these studies, although undertaken 
at local levels, relied on responses from individuals at 
director level, who may not be involved in actual resource 
allocation decisions (as noted in the Welsh study). The 
fourth and final example looked at what was happening 
at decision-making level in a public hospital and commu-
nity care group in Australia, involving a wide range of 
staff, including those at decision-making level. Although 
the focus of the study was disinvestments, a complex set 
of decision-making processes were found, but there were 
very few set criteria or explicit frameworks/processes for 
decision-making.13
This study, therefore, aimed to understand approaches 
to priority setting at decision-maker (rather than director) 
level.
MethODs
Context
The chosen exemplar area for the study is National Health 
Service (NHS) dentistry in England which currently 
incurs a spend of around £3.7 billion per year or 3.5% 
of the NHS budget.14 In the NHS in England, the ‘World 
Class Commissioning’ programme set out expectations 
of commissioners and frameworks for commissioning. 
At the heart of this, is the commissioning cycle15 which 
is split into three phases: strategic planning, procuring 
services and monitoring and evaluation. The phase most 
relevant to this study is strategic planning which is subdi-
vided into three subphases: assessing need, reviewing 
service provision and setting priorities.
Unlike much of NHS commissioning in England, 
a national body (a commissioning board now known 
as NHS England) is responsible for commissioning of 
dentistry with part development to subregional teams.14 
The size of subregional teams varies but as an exemplar, 
Greater London is a region which has four subregions 
within it. Although the budget for dentistry in devolved 
to each region and it is established that subregional teams 
have the power to and responsibility for procuring dental 
services in their region, there is no formal agreement 
about where the power and responsibility for strategic 
decisions such as priority setting for allocating resources, 
or for other unusual situations (such as legal challenges 
to procurement decisions). It is worth noting here that 
at the time of the study, early preparations were being 
made for a much larger scale devolution of governmental 
power for one region (Greater Manchester) which would 
include total devolution of all health budgets and power.
In each subregional team, a lead commissioner for 
dentistry is responsible for purchasing all dental services 
required for their population from providers, which are, 
in the main, primary care dental practices with smaller 
amounts allocated to specialist providers in both primary 
and secondary care settings. The primary care contract is 
mainly based around a standardised national contract in 
which a certain number of units of dental activity (UDAs) 
are bought from providers for a negotiated price. The 
UDAs are generated by provision of three different bands 
of treatment generating 1, 3 and 12 UDAs depending on 
the type of dental treatment provided. Contracts with 
specialist providers (such as hospital or community clinics 
or specialist practices with specialised dentists undertaking 
complex procedures or working with complex patients) 
vary in nature significantly between subregions and 
between providers. Dental lead commissioners are usually 
supported by a team of contract managers and adminis-
trators as well a local dental network (LDN), a group of 
clinicians, whose chair is employed by the commissioning 
team to provide clinical input. In addition commissioners 
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rely on advice from consultants in dental public health 
(CDPH) employed by a separate body (Public Health 
England), but whose roles are partly to provide advice 
on dental needs and demand and care provision. The 
commissioning structure is shown in figure 1.
Given concerns raised in the literature around the use 
of terms in the area of resource allocation,16 as part of 
the context for the study, some key terms will be defined 
here. The study adopts an economics-based perspective 
as its theoretical underpinning and was concerned with 
how priorities are set for resource allocation. In order to 
allocate resources to be invested in services, in most situ-
ations (given the likelihood of a fixed budget size) there 
must be a release of resources (a disinvestment) from 
decommissioning other activity. This approach is at odds 
with some non-economics-based sets of definitions which 
start from the perspective of disinvestment.4 The terms 
commission and investment as well as disinvestment (but 
not decommissioning) were in common usage within 
the context and at the time of the study. The terms used 
in the interviews and this paper therefore are priority 
setting, resource allocation, commissioning, investment 
and disinvestment.
This study forms part of an ongoing programme work, 
the Resource Allocation in NHS Dentistry: Recognition 
of Societal Preferences (RAINDROP) project, looking 
to implement economic tools in NHS England dental 
commissioning, the full protocol of which is reported else-
where.17 The larger programme follows a participatory 
action research (PAR) approach and the study reported 
here corresponds with the first element of PAR, the ‘plan’ 
phase. The methodology employed was semistructured 
interviews analysed using a framework approach.
Participants and recruitment
The sample was drawn from the NHS England commis-
sioners responsible for leading dental commissioning in 
subregional areas (n=31). The study was explained during 
a commissioning seminar offered to all NHS England 
commissioners responsible for leading dental commis-
sioning in subregional areas and all those attending were 
invited to participate. A follow-up email was sent to all 
dental lead commissioners including those not present 
at the seminar. One further reminder email was sent to 
selected commissioners who had not responded at the 
initial seminar nor to the follow-up email. These were 
selected purposively with the aim of recruiting further 
participants to ensure representation of different regions. 
A written participant information sheet was provided at 
the seminar and also attached to each email and written 
consent was taken from those wishing to participate.
Interviews
Individual semistructured interviews were conducted by 
one male clinical academic with a background in paedi-
atric dentistry (BDS, MPaedDent) and health economics 
(PhD) as well as formal training and experience of inter-
viewing for qualitative research (CRV). Participants did 
not have an existing relationship with the interviewer, 
but were aware of the interviewer’s background and also 
Figure 1 Dental commissioning structure in the NHS in England. NHS, National Health Service; UDAs, units of dental activity.
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the wider context of the research in terms of this being 
part of a programme about using health economics 
tools for priority setting in dental commissioning, which 
was explained at the seminar or at the beginning of the 
interview for those not present at the seminar. Most 
interviews (n=10) were conducted in a private room at 
the commissioners’ place of work. However, where it was 
impossible to arrange this, telephone interviews were 
used (n=2). Interviews followed a topic guide (avail-
able in full as online supplementary file 1), which was 
initially developed by the wider research team based on 
previous research and evolved as interviews continued. 
The topic guide covered experience and role in commis-
sioning, relationships with stakeholders in commis-
sioning dentistry, relationships with dentistry’s national 
team, barriers to commissioning and opportunities and 
techniques for priority setting in resource allocation. 
Interviews lasted between 20 and 68 min with a mean of 
43 min. The interviews were audio recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim. Additional limited field notes were 
taken during the interview.
Analysis
Transcripts were uploaded into NVivo V.11 for manage-
ment. A coding frame was developed by discussion with the 
wider team including public representatives. Coding was 
applied to two transcripts by CRV and GT independently 
and compared. CRV then coded all other manuscripts and 
GT reviewed this coding and amended after discussion. A 
framework analysis18 was then undertaken, initially by CRV 
and GT and then with input from the wider team in order 
to identify emerging themes and concepts.
Patient involvement
During the development of the study, the National Insti-
tute of Health Research, Research Design Service North 
East Patient and Public Involvement Consumer Panel 
were actively involved in both defining aspects of the 
research questions to be addressed and in the develop-
ment of the project and application.
During the actual conduct of the study, two members of 
the public sat on the steering group for the wider RAIN-
DROP project and have influenced the ongoing design 
of the research as well as being involved in the analysis at 
the design of the coding frame stage and then through 
discussion of emerging results.
results
response
The recruitment process resulted in 14 positive responses 
and 1 refusal to participate with 16 non-responders. It 
was impossible to arrange an interview with two positive 
responders and so, 12 interviews were completed. After this 
initial set of 12 interviews, data were reviewed but as data 
saturation was noted no further reminders were issued.
In the sample of 12 commissioners interviewed, 
all regions of England were represented. Further 
demographic details are not reported due to the small 
size of the population group and the potential for de-an-
onymising individuals. In addition, for this reason, only 
participant number (1–14 as the 2 commissioners who 
an interview were not arranged for were allocated ID 
numbers) are given with the quotes below, which are 
presented to illustrate the findings discussed.
Three major themes arose: methods of priority setting 
and barriers to explicit approaches; relationships with key 
stakeholders and advisors; tensions between national and 
local responsibilities.
Methods of priority setting and barriers to explicit approaches
Although participants felt there was a real opportu-
nity for undertaking the whole commissioning cycle in 
dentistry, it was stated that the procuring services and 
monitoring elements (often referred to by commissioners 
as ‘contracting’) of the cycle dominated and that other 
aspects of commissioning, in particular the strategic plan-
ning aspects (which would include priority setting) did 
not occur in many cases.
The patch has got bigger, it has got a bit more com-
plex, the resources have got less, so very heavily fo-
cussed on what I would call the contracting side, with 
limited opportunities to do any proper real commis-
sioning. Participant 3 
There were several different reasons given for this lack 
of strategic planning activity. These included a lack of 
knowledge and skills within the team, a lack of time due 
to the demands of contracting activity, and having to wait 
for guidance from the national team. In terms of a lack 
of knowledge and skills this related both to the special-
ised knowledge required for dentistry and the lack of 
commissioning skills (such as understanding resource/
budget use, strategic planning, stakeholder engagement, 
procurement rules and legal requirement as well as 
understanding of the specific area (dentistry)) in teams. 
There was some evidence that participants felt that teams 
had detailed dental knowledge but less generic commis-
sioning skills.
We have had external consultants working for us 
which is fine but … thinking about the fact that we 
have got a team of 30, it’s thinking should we really be 
trying to upskill the team? And, yet we are in a certain 
place and we have had to buy in some subject matter 
expertise. Participant 6 
The lack of knowledge and time was magnified in some 
areas where teams covered small areas but were desig-
nated as generic ‘primary care’ teams covering multiple 
types of providers (general medical practitioners, phar-
macists, optometrists as well as dentists), with individuals 
in the teams dealing with multiple provider types and 
the ‘dental’ lead actually being a ‘primary care’ lead. In 
other areas teams, individual team members and the lead 
were allocated specifically to dentistry but across a larger 
area. Although it appeared that dental specific, large area 
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teams engaged more in the strategic planning activities, 
those in more generic but smaller area teams felt they 
could develop better relationships with their providers.
My personal view is I think you need specialist teams, 
particularly for dentistry, particularly because you 
don't have the support … Historically in [pre 2012 
structure], I could have accessed health and safety, in-
fection prevention, a whole raft of clinical governance 
people. [I] can't do that now because if it sits in [dif-
ferent area of structure] and they don't want to know 
about dental. So I do think you need a specialist team 
because we will have an awareness of those things, as 
a minimum. People are learning all the time but ac-
tually, you don't get below the surface. Participant 8 
Whether the team was dental specific or not, teams 
were being asked to cover increasingly large geographical 
areas as teams merged and this was exacerbating the lack 
of time and resources. In addition, there was an increasing 
burden of contracting activity in terms of monitoring of 
current contractors and legal challenges.
When questioned directly about priority setting aspects 
of the strategic planning, participants had clear ideas 
about some of the specific areas with resource allocation 
problems.
We have got [good] guidelines for orthodontics but 
then you still hear comments about, “Well, should we 
really be prioritising all of that when we have got all 
these children with decay and we have got all these 
elderly people in nursing homes with complex res-
torations that are just falling apart now because they 
are old and they are struggling with health and other 
things that impact then on the roll-out?’Participant 2 
However, when asked how they set priorities for invest-
ments and disinvestments in different services, no commis-
sioners mentioned undertaking any proactive priority 
setting and no systematic attempts were mentioned. 
Rather, they felt that their resource allocation, where it 
did happen was reactive to oral health needs assessments, 
pressure from clinicians and pressure from politicians.
We get representation. We get MPs ‘we want a dental 
practice here, we want that here’, the consultants say-
ing…, this consultant, that consultant, orthodontists 
all saying ‘it should go to orthodontics’. How we’re 
going to manage it; I think the group’s struggling 
with that. Participant 13 
The advice or pressure from clinicians was described as 
conflicting and potentially self-interested.
Well we have consultants turning up who say that 
restorative dentistry is the priority and then we have 
Public Health and our LDCs’ representatives saying 
that … dentists on the high street, need support. … 
and we have community teams turning up wanting 
lots of extra money in their contracts. So they’re all 
there looking after their own areas. Participant 1 
There was a recognition that expertise and tools to aid 
priority setting would be useful, especially in the light 
of limited skills in commissioning teams, but also that 
national direction on what the priorities for investing and 
disinvesting should be would be useful.
Yes, so, …because we can’t do everything, we only 
have a limited budget, then a clearer steer on some of 
these issues would be helpful but is it a national pol-
icy that we continue to do this or not? Participant 2 
Finally, the national contract used between commis-
sioners and primary care dental providers, based on the 
generation of UDAs and in general held in perpetuity by 
providers, was seen as a barrier to reallocating resources 
(although some resource may be released if providers fail 
to meet their contractual obligations, request a renegotia-
tion or terminate a contract and secondary care contracts 
are generally time limited).
There's very little commissioning that you can do at 
the moment, largely because the large bulk of our 
contracts are in non-time limited [general primary 
care dentistry] contracts. Participant 4 
However, one commissioner did report that the contract 
and UDAs had not held them back, and they had found 
ways around this, such as using other minor, little used 
clauses in the contract.
You can’t use a UDA [for allocating resources for pri-
orities]. For me it’s like a bean counting system, but 
we have been able to use the contracts innovatively 
and use some of the public health element within the 
contracts. Participant 9 
relationships with key stakeholders and advisors
The commissioners articulated the need for good clin-
ical advice to support their commissioning and priority 
setting activities.
[Without the support of PHE and clinicians] we would 
just be a bit of an island and not be successful, I don’t 
think, in what we do. But I think it’s that teamwork 
and that clinical engagement that helps. Participant 9 
It seemed that the advice came from three different 
sources, which were different for different commis-
sioners. First, some relied on their LDN and its chair. 
However, there was a feeling that there was still a lack of 
clarity about the nature and power of the LDN and its 
relationship to the commissioner.
I think it’s still bedding down, you know, the [LDN], 
you feel like it’s an organisation without any teeth, it’s 
very much more a talking shop. I think the conflict of 
interest makes things extremely difficult.Participant 
11 
It’s one of those things that’s a little bit frustrating, 
from my perspective; when we had the pilot, [LDN], 
it very much sat within my control, and now [that it’s 
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not a pilot but established,] I no longer have control 
and, being a control freak, that’s a little bit difficult 
to cope with … we’re also trying to work out how we 
work together, what they do, what we do… we’re try-
ing to get that understanding of what the LPN is actu-
ally there to deliver. Participant 14 
Second, many commissioners looked to their CDPH 
colleagues for clinical advice, but the strength of relation-
ship depended on the availability in the subregional area 
and also whether the DPH team were colocated with the 
commissioning team.
Also, we know [the CDPHs] are being spread a lot 
more thinly, they’re being brought in to do more na-
tional bits of work, which is great, potentially, for the 
national bit but, for us, it’s beginning to feel like a bit 
of a hole. I think we feel it more because we’ve been 
very active, in terms of working with them and using 
them; I think other areas haven’t got that history. I 
know in [neighbouring sub-regional area], they’re 
thinking, ‘Great, we’ve got some support now, which 
we never had before.’ Participant 13 
Finally, some commissioners relied on dentists 
employed directly by the commissioning team as dental 
practice advisors (DPAs). These individuals are trained 
and employed to advise on contract monitoring issues 
and provide advice on quality issues with single providers, 
but some commissioners were using them in alternative 
ways for strategic planning.
We have very good clinical advice from [the DPAs] 
and all sorts of advice really. Obviously not just clini-
cal. Participant 7 
It appeared that those with good relationships with 
LDNs and CDPHs felt more able to undertake priority 
setting, resource allocation and the whole commissioning 
cycle in general.
I’m really enthusiastic about dentistry and the work 
that we do here in [the region] and I don’t think we 
could do it without the support of [CDPHs], without 
the support of our [LDN]. Participant 9 
There was a general frustration with the limited rela-
tionship (either in terms of strength of relationship, 
quality of relationship or absence altogether) with several 
other stakeholders namely, patients, Health Education 
England (with a responsibility for ongoing education of 
the dental team and workforce planning) and non-dental 
commissioners (who may have several overlapping areas 
such as emergency and out of hours care, care of special 
needs groups and health promotion).
We really did struggle, we wanted actual patient reps 
on both of the [LDNs] but we really struggled with 
that. . so that is going to be a challenge for us, to 
identify the right patients that don't have a vested in-
terest. Participant 4 
national versus local responsibilities
Participants noted both advantages and disadvantages to 
having a nationally commissioned system but also stated 
that the reality was confusing with a lack of clarity over 
whether decisions (not only relating to resource alloca-
tion but more widely) were actually taken at national and 
local level in reality.
If the view is that NHS England is going to do it once 
nationally, then that’s what we need to do; we need to 
stop faffing about with local this and local that, and 
actually make it a national organisation. If they’re 
looking to devolve it, then we need to think a bit dif-
ferently about how you can devolve those decisions 
within a national framework, and I think you would 
need very clear expectations about how that would 
work, and what rules you were working within. Either 
way, there needs to be more direction. Participant 14 
We get very mixed messages about, well, are we a lo-
cal office working within NHS England and national 
structure, or are we the local accountable body for 
implementing the NHS England policy, that has got 
nothing to do with the centre, and they fluctuate be-
tween those views, really. Participant 13 
Positive aspects of nationally led commissioning 
included both the need to only do things once rather than 
repeat a process in each subregion and also the consist-
ency that came with having one way of doing things.
We still have 31 different ways of doing things in some 
ways unfortunately and it’s great to be able to get a 
piece of paper in a meeting, or say, ‘Just look at the 
link, that’s what we are using that underpins every-
thing now.’ Participant 6 
However, the downsides were that there was a limit in 
local flexibility and that local commissioners had to wait 
for central decisions, sometimes beyond when a decision 
needed to made locally. There was real concern that it was 
not clear where the responsibility or power for decisions 
rested and so some decisions were not taken at all.
We’ve got all of our community dental services [con-
tracts] that are going to be expiring [soon after 
interview]. Because we haven't got the [national] pae-
diatric [dentistry commissioning] guide yet, we don't 
want to go out to commission new services until we've 
got the paediatric guide because we could commis-
sion something that isn't in line with that. Participant 
4 
For the dental lead commissioners in subregional 
teams, there was often a confusion between who they 
were answering to, whether this was the regional director 
and board (who held the budget) or the national NHS 
England dental team, who were sometimes giving 
different messages. There was also a recognition that the 
national team was too small to be effective.
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We’ve got this difficulty in terms of local and national 
because, actually, a lot of what we do within dentistry, 
we will go directly to the national team and then, lo-
cally, the … Directors are saying, ‘Well, hold on a min-
ute, we don’t know anything about this.’ Participant 
14 
[In the national team] With three people doing 
[dentistry], and they don't just do dentistry either, 
they need additional support because [with] the 
structure that [was] set up, [they] either give us the 
autonomy to do things locally, in which case let us 
have the resources to do that. Or, if you want more of 
a central steer, give them the resources so that they 
can do it as well. Participant 4 
DIsCussIOn
This exploratory qualitative study using semistructured 
interviews with commissioners found that NHS England 
dental commissioners felt that there were problems with 
current resource allocation and that proactive, system-
atic priority setting for the allocations did not happen. 
Respondents felt that barriers to priority setting activity 
included a lack of time, a lack of knowledge, a lack of skills 
and inflexible contracting arrangements. Commissioners 
relied heavily on good links with LDNs and CDPHs for 
clinical input into commissioning decisions but these 
links varied. Where links were strong, commissioners 
felt more able to undertake priority setting. When it did 
occur, the priority setting process was driven by political 
and clinician pressure as well as needs assessments, rather 
than more explicit processes. As described in the intro-
duction, we would see these explicit processes as ‘making 
decisions whereby options for change (both investments 
and disinvestments) are assessed against each other on 
the basis of defined criteria, weighted for relative impor-
tance, and considered also against the cost of each such 
option.’
There was also a tension between the national team and 
the subregional commissioners. Dentistry is, in theory, a 
nationally commissioned service yet in reality budgets 
and therefore resource allocation decisions are devolved 
to regional level, generating confusion about where 
authority and responsibility lies.
As described in the introduction, the study is unusual in 
conducting in-depth interviews with those actually making 
resource allocation decisions (ie, subregional commis-
sioners) rather than at a higher managerial level (eg, 
board members, financial directors or national leaders, 
who may also need to undertake priority setting and 
resource allocation decisions but at a more strategic level) 
and also looked at decision-makers across a whole country 
rather than in one area or a small number of case study 
areas. In addition, by adopting qualitative methodology, 
the reasons for adopting specific approaches to resource 
allocation could be explored in depth. However, due to 
the limited total number of individuals involved in dental 
commissioning in England, the numbers were small (even 
though 40% of this population were surveyed), although 
it appeared data saturation was reached in the interviews. 
Additionally, one specific area of healthcare commis-
sioning (dental) was studied with an unusual configura-
tion compared with other areas of health in the country 
studied, which may lead to specific findings not relatable 
to other areas of healthcare commissioning. Nonetheless, 
a considerable amount of NHS national spend relates to 
dentistry and so this is a worthwhile area to study.
Compared with the two of the studies noted in the Intro-
duction section,3 11 where there was a move towards some 
use of priority setting tools, the findings here indicate that 
there was no use within the setting of this study, which does 
fit with what was found in Australian study described in the 
Introduction section.13 This may reflect the fact that the 
specific health area has not yet engaged with these tools or 
that these tools are only used at the more strategic/manage-
rial levels covered in the two other studies. It is interesting 
to note that the most important resource used for priority 
setting here, needs assessment, was also the most frequently 
used in the questionnaire-based study of Robinson et al.3 
Looking at the barriers to priority setting, this study had 
strikingly similar results to a similar study undertaken with 
dental commissioners in one English region 10 years previ-
ously,19 with consistent themes of contracting activity domi-
nating commissioning, frustration with a lack of national 
direction and limited-resource reallocation possibilities 
due to the nature of contracts. At the time of the previous 
study, dentistry was commissioned within much smaller 
local organisations (primary care trusts) with full budgetary 
and decision-making control and local structures providing 
all advice and support in house locally. However, there was 
still a national dental lead (the chief dental officer) but this 
role was only advisory to the independent local organisa-
tions. The similarities in findings suggest that despite mark-
edly different structures being in place now, the challenges 
remain the same and have not been addressed in over a 
decade. The findings in this paper also fit with the Sustain-
ability in Health care by Allocating Resources Effectively 
programme in Australia in a public hospital and community 
care group, where a disconnect between senior managers 
and those at more local decision-making levels was observed 
and barriers of time and expertise were noted.13 20 This 
suggests that the findings may be generalisable beyond the 
English and dental settings.
The case for explicit prioritisation in resource alloca-
tion decisions is made in the introduction but does not 
appear to be occurring in the context of this study. Given 
the reported lack of skills in and time for priority setting, 
frameworks such as PBMA, MCDA, A4R and STAR may 
be useful in simplifying the process and making explicit 
priority setting more accessible. The study also suggests 
that good links with clinical advice sources should be 
prioritised and grown, given that commissioners felt 
more able to set priorities when good links were in place 
and there may be a case for integrating this clinical advice 
fully into commissioning teams. In addition, the findings 
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suggest that where a national system is operationalised at 
subregional levels, care needs to be taken to be explicit 
about where power and responsibility lie.
In terms of future research, there is a need to consider 
how more explicit priority setting mechanisms including 
the use of tools can be embedded into day-to-day opera-
tional commissioning decisions, which may be through 
better illustrating their utility as well as designing appro-
priate training and simplifying their use and adoptability.
COnClusIOn
Commissioners recognised a need for resource realloca-
tion but relied on clinical advice and needs assessment in 
order to set priorities. Links with clinical advice sources 
were, therefore, seen as key. A lack of time and exper-
tise were barriers to more formalised priority setting and 
resource reallocation, as was the structure of the commis-
sioning system, with tensions between local and national 
control and the contract for the service in question, 
dentistry, which perpetuated historical allocations.
Author affiliations
1Centre for Oral Health Research, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
2Child Dental Health, Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK
3Social Business and Health, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK
4Department of Nursing, Midwifery and Health, Northumbria University, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, UK
5Faculty of Health and Life Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, 
UK
Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge the large contribution 
of the late Jimmy Steele CBE to the genesis of the idea of this study as well as a 
major contribution to the design and set-up. In addition, the authors wish to thank 
the Oral and Dental Patient and Public Involvement Group at Newcastle University 
and particularly Irene Soulsby and Ian Armstrong for their advice on the study 
design, input into analysis and their ongoing support of the wider study. Finally, the 
authors wish to thank NHS England, the Office of the Chief Dental Officer (England) 
and the individual commissioners for access and giving up their time for the 
interviews. 
Contributors CRV was the lead for the conception and design of the study, 
collected the data, was involved in the analysis and drafted the manuscript. GT was 
involved in the analysis and critically revised the manuscript. CD was involved in 
the conception and design of the study, was involved in the analysis and critically 
revised the manuscript. JG was involved in the analysis and critically revised 
the manuscript. RH was involved in the conception and design of the study, was 
involved in the analysis and critically revised the manuscript. KC was involved in the 
analysis and critically revised the manuscript. CE was involved in the conception 
and design of the study, was involved in the analysis and critically revised the 
manuscript. All authors approved the final manuscript.
Funding The study is funded through a Clinician Scientist Fellowship for CRV from 
the National Institute for Health Research.
Disclaimer  The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily 
those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health.
Competing interests None declared.
Patient consent for publication Not required.
ethics approval  Ethical approval has been granted for the study by Newcastle 
University Ethics Committee (Ref No. 00873/2015). In addition, approval was gained 
from the Health Research Authority to undertake research within the NHS (Ref No. 
IRAS 184704). 
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement No additional data are available.
Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits 
others to copy, redistribute, remix, transform and build upon this work for any 
purpose, provided the original work is properly cited, a link to the licence is given, 
and indication of whether changes were made. See: https:// creativecommons. org/ 
licenses/ by/ 4. 0/.
reFerenCes
 1. Donaldson C, Shackley P, Detels R, et al. Economic Evaluation. 
Oxford textbook of public health. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997.
 2. Mitton C, Donaldson C. Priority setting toolkit: a guide to the use of 
economics in healthcare decision making: BMJ Books, 2004.
 3. Robinson S, Dickinson H, Freeman T, et al. Structures and 
processes for priority-setting by health-care funders: a national 
survey of primary care trusts in England. Health Serv Manage Res 
2012;25:113–20.
 4. Harris C, Green S, Elshaug AG. Sustainability in Health care by 
Allocating Resources Effectively (SHARE) 10: operationalising 
disinvestment in a conceptual framework for resource allocation. 
BMC Health Serv Res 2017;17.
 5. Thokala P, Duenas A. Multiple criteria decision analysis for health 
technology assessment. Value Health 2012;15:1172–81.
 6. Daniels N, Sabin J. Limits to health care: fair procedures, democratic 
deliberation, and the legitimacy problem for insurers. Philos Public 
Aff 1997;26:303–50.
 7. Mitton C, Dionne F, Donaldson C. Managing healthcare budgets 
in times of austerity: the role of program budgeting and marginal 
analysis. Appl Health Econ Health Policy 2014;12:95–102.
 8. Airoldi M, Morton A, Smith JA, et al. STAR-people-powered 
prioritization: a 21st-century solution to allocation headaches. Med 
Decis Making 2014;34:965–75.
 9. Public Health England. The prioritisation framework: making the most 
of your budget 2018. https://www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/ 
the- prioritisation- framework- making- the- most- of- your- budget 
(Accessed 20th Jun 2018).
 10. Kapiriri L, Razavi D. How have systematic priority setting approaches 
influenced policy making? A synthesis of the current literature. Health 
Policy 2017;121:937–46.
 11. Karlsberg Schaffer S, Sussex J, Hughes D, et al. Opportunity costs 
and local health service spending decisions: a qualitative study from 
Wales. BMC Health Serv Res 2016;16:103.
 12. Karlsberg Schaffer S, Sussex J, Devlin N, et al. Local health care 
expenditure plans and their opportunity costs. Health Policy 
2015;119:1237–44.
 13. Harris C, Allen K, Waller C, et al. Sustainability in health care by 
allocating resources effectively (SHARE) 3: examining how resource 
allocation decisions are made, implemented and evaluated in a local 
healthcare setting. BMC Health Serv Res 2017;17.
 14. NHS Commissioning Board. Securing excellence in commissioning. 
London: NHS dental services, 2013.
 15. Centre HaSCI. Information for world class commissioning. 2008 
http:// webarchive. nationalarchives. gov. uk/ 20090122041444/ http:// 
www. ic. nhs. uk/ webfiles/ commissioningcycle. pdf (Accessed 25th Oct 
2018).
 16. Harris C, Green S, Ramsey W, et al. Sustainability in Health care 
by Allocating Resources Effectively (SHARE) 9: conceptualising 
disinvestment in the local healthcare setting. BMC Health Serv Res 
2017;17:633.
 17. Vernazza CR, Carr K, Wildman J, et al. Resource allocation in NHS 
dentistry: recognition of societal preferences (RAINDROP): study 
protocol. BMC Health Serv Res 2018;18:487.
 18. Ritchie J, Lewis J. Qualitative research practice: a guide for social 
science students and researchers. London Thousand Oaks, Calif: 
Sage Publications, 2003.
 19. Holmes RD, Steele JG, Donaldson C, et al. Learning from contract 
change in primary care dentistry: a qualitative study of stakeholders 
in the north of England. Health Policy 2015;119:1218–25.
 20. Harris C, Allen K, Brooke V, et al. Sustainability in Health care by 
Allocating Resources Effectively (SHARE) 6: investigating methods to 
identify, prioritise, implement and evaluate disinvestment projects in 
a local healthcare setting. BMC Health Serv Res 2017;17.
 o
n
 28 M
arch 2019 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/
BM
J O
pen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024995 on 23 March 2019. Downloaded from 
